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Abstract
The current Labour Government has embarked on radical public sector reform in England. A so-called ‘Modernisation Agenda’ has
been developed that is encapsulated in the NHS Plan—a document that details a long-term vision for health care. This plan involves
a five-fold strategy: investment through greater public funding; quality assurance; improving access; service integration and inter-
professional working; and providing a public health focus.
The principles of Labour’s vision have been broadly supported. However, achieving its aims appears reliant on two key factors. First,
appropriate resources are required to create capacity, particularly management capacity, to enable new functions to develop. Second,
promoting access and service integration requires the development of significant co-ordination, collaboration and networking between
agencies and individuals. This is particularly important for health and social care professionals. Their historically separate professions
suggest that a significant period of change management is required to allow new roles and partnerships to evolve.
In an attempt to secure delivery of its goals, however, the Government has placed the emphasis on further organisational restructuring.
In doing so, the Government may have missed the key challenges faced in delivering its NHS Plan. As this paper argues, cultural
and behavioural change is probably a far more appropriate and important requirement for success than a centrally directed approach
that emphasises the rearrangement of structural furniture.
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Creating an integrated public
sector?
Labour’s plans for the modernisation of
the English health care system
In England, the principles of a tax-based service, free
at the point of delivery and universally accessible to
all, have remained largely unchallenged since the
National Health Service was founded in 1948. Never-
theless, health care policy in England has been char-
acterised by successive packages of ‘reform’. These
reform packages have attempted to deal with the
growing stresses faced by most health care systems
in Western countries including the rising demand for,
and costs of, health care services w1x.
During the 1990s, the UK embraced ‘managed com-
petition’ as a way to control the costs of health care
services w2x. Hospitals and community services be-
came self-governing ‘trusts’ in competition for con-
tracts from local health authorities who had previously
managed hospital care directly. Moreover, the system
was extended to allow groups of primary care physi-
cians to hold funds to purchase mainly elective care
w3x. The purpose was to engender quality, efficiency,
innovation and better productivity to the delivery of
care and the approach became a popular model for
other nations to adapt. For example, a Conservative
Government in New Zealand reacted to its fiscal crisis
by introducing similar market principles into health
care in the early 1990s including the transformation
of public hospitals into Crown Health Enterprises to
compete for contracts w4x.
Whilst other countries continue to grapple with the
demands of ‘managed competition’, England’s dalli-
ance with the process appears to have been short-
lived, as the expected efficiency savings from
competition have failed to materialise. Indeed, the
management costs of creating and maintaining a
health care market increased the NHS administrative
budget sharply w3x. Moreover, the market approach
fuelled organisational protectionism and precluded the
provision of comprehensive care at low cost w5x.I n
essence, the collective ethos of the NHS was seriously
undermined and, as a result, a health service devel-International Journal of Integrated Care – Vol. 2, 1 March 2002 – ISSN 1568-4156 – http://www.ijic.org/
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oped that was increasingly inequitable in terms of
access to care whilst health inequalities between high
and low social classes widened w6x. Indeed, the Gov-
ernments of most other nations that implemented
competition policies in health care during the 1990s
have been pulling back from managed competition
w7x.
As an alternative to ‘managed competition’, the current
Labour Government has embarked on another period
of public sector reform in what it euphemistically calls
its ‘Modernisation Agenda’ w8x. A new collective vision
for health care delivery in England was encapsulated
in The NHS Plan of July 2000 w9x. The key elements
of the agenda appear to be based on a five-fold
proposal:
1. Investment through greater public funding;
2. Ensuring quality standards;
3. Improving access to care services;
4. Promoting inter-professional working and integrat-
ing service provision; and
5. Providing a more public health or ‘whole-systems’
approach.
Investment through greater
public funding
For many years, the historically low level of GDP
spent on health care in England was regarded as a
sign of efficiency in delivering a high quality and
universal health care system w10x. Rising demand for
care and increasing costs of care were approached
without fundamentally increasing this share of invest-
ment. The NHS Plan, however, argued that the NHS
had failed to deliver because of ‘decades of under
investment’ leading to insufficient capacity (lack of
doctors, nurses and other care staff) to provide the
services required to respond to the individual needs
of patients. The Government has since pledged to
raise funding levels for health care to the European
average within five years w11x.
The investment strategy to be employed is based on
providing increased capacity both in health care facil-
ities and in numbers of staff. The Plan pledges an
additional 7000 hospital and intermediate care beds
and 100 new hospitals by the year 2010. Moreover,
the Plan envisages the creation of 500 new one-stop
primary care centres, 3000 modernised general prac-
titioner premises, 250 new scanners, cleaner hospital
wards, and a ‘modern’ information technology system
in every hospital and family doctor’s surgery. In terms
of investment in staff, the Plan suggests that the
Health Service requires 7500 more hospital consult-
ants, 2000 more general practitioners, 6500 extra
therapists and in excess of 20,000 nurses. These
major investments in the capacity of the NHS in
England, if followed, equate to an increase in invest-
ment of at least one third in real terms. The need to
increase the burden of tax to cater for the financial
needs of the NHS appears to be widely supported by
both public and opposition parties w12x.
Ensuring quality standards
The investment strategy in the NHS is to be accom-
panied by a far more managed and centrally controlled
approach to providing health care services. The strat-
egy builds on work the Department of Health had
begun to put in place soon after Labour’s election
victory in 1997 w13x. A range of national standards on
care provision are being pursued in order to improve
quality and reduce unacceptable variations in stan-
dards of care. These include National Service Frame-
works; a National Institute for Clinical Effectiveness;
and a Commission for Health Improvement to monitor
the delivery of care under a new national performance
framework w14x.
National service frameworks
National Service Frameworks aim to set national stan-
dards of care provision by defining service models,
underpinning and supporting programmes of local
delivery, and developing high-level performance
indicators against which progress within agreed time
scales can be measured. Five National Service
Frameworks have so far been produced, three in the
disease areas of cancer, coronary heart disease, and
diabetes w15–17x and a further two for mental health
and older people’s care w18,19x. Frameworks for chil-
dren’s health and renal services will be published in
2002.
Key objectives set by National Service Frameworks
reflect priorities in the National Health Service w20x.
For example, reducing mortality rates by 40 per cent
for coronary heart disease and 20 per cent for cancer
amongst the under 75s by 2010. For older people, the
emphasis has been placed on the delivery of high
quality pre-admission and rehabilitation care in order
to promote independence and reduce hospitalisation
rates (see Box 1). The Framework stresses the need
for health and social care agencies to integrate service
provision to achieve this. Milestones include the cre-
ation of a single assessment process; investing in
intermediate care facilities to reduce the delay in
transfer out of hospital care; and reducing the annual
rate of increase in elderly emergency admissions to
less than 2 per cent w21x.International Journal of Integrated Care – Vol. 2, 1 March 2002 – ISSN 1568-4156 – http://www.ijic.org/
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Box 1. Summary of the National Service Framework Approach: Older People’s Care
Objective: To provide high quality pre-admission and rehabilitation care to
older people. To help older people live as independently as possible
by reducing preventable hospitalisation and ensuring year-on-year
reductions in delays in moving over 75s on from hospital.
Targets: By April 2002:
● a single assessment process between health and social care
including a proactive process of identifying and inviting more
vulnerable people for assessment
● to lower the average rate of delayed transfer of care for people
over 75 to 10% of the 2000y01 level;
● to ensure that the average per capita rate of emergency
admissions for people aged 75 or over is less than 2% and
that the rate of readmissions within 28 days of discharge does
not increase
● create 1500 more intermediate care beds and undertake 60,000
more treatments
● increase the number of people who live at home by 2%
Mechanisms: ● Promote flu vaccinations
● Develop joint assessment procedures between health and
social care
● Develop joint working between health and social care
● Needs assessment for nursing and residential beds
Box 2. The National Institute for Clinical Effectiveness w22x
Objective: To provide patients and health professionals with robust and reliable
guidance on ‘best practice’ covering both individual health
technologies (e.g. medicines) and the clinical management of such
conditions.
Targets: Recent technologies appraised include hip prostheses, taxanes for
ovarian cancer and breast cancer, coronary stents, proton pump
inhibitors for dyspepsia, hearing aids, Zanamivir (Relenza) flu, and
Rosiglitazone for type 2 diabetes
Mechanisms: – Independent assessment of published evidence;
– Verbal and written submissions from publicycarer organisations,
professional organisations and manufacturers;
– Evaluation report with consultation and appeals period;
– Guidance issued on level of use in NHS
Examples: Taxanes for ovarian cancer
– access to the product has varied considerably across NHS
– NICE concluded that when a woman reaches an ‘appropriate
stage’ in her ovarian cancer she should be offered Taxane. The
guidance would allow 1000 additional women to benefit at a cost
of around £7 m
Zanamivir (Relenza) flu
– should not be used by an otherwise healthy individual
can be used for those at risk when flu is present in the community
and patients can start medication within 48 hours of their symptoms
starting
The national institute for clinical
effectiveness
The creation of the National Institute for Clinical Effect-
iveness in April 1999 has been a further key element
of the Government’s approach to integrate quality
standards. The aim of the National Institute for Clinical
Effectiveness is to ensure that drugs are prescribed
in an appropriate and cost effective manner and to
standardise drug use across the NHS w22x. For exam-International Journal of Integrated Care – Vol. 2, 1 March 2002 – ISSN 1568-4156 – http://www.ijic.org/
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Box 3. The NHS Performance Rating System – key targets for acute hospitals w27x
  Shorter inpatient waiting lists
  No inpatients waiting more than 18 months for inpatient treatment
  Reduction in outpatient waiting
  Fewer patients waiting on trolleys for more than 12 hours
  Less than 1% of operations cancelled on the day
  No patients with suspected breast cancer waiting more than two weeks to be seen in hospital
  Commitment to improving the working lives of staff
  Hospital cleanliness
  A satisfactory financial position
  Not receiving a critical report from the Commission for Health Improvement
ple, it dictated which drug treatments should be uni-
versally prescribed across the country for cancer care
(see Box 2). This process has helped put an end to
the perceived ‘postcode lottery’ in prescriptions of
cancer drugs.
The National Institute for Clinical Effectiveness has,
however, courted controversy since it is regarded by
many as a political body set up to ration drug use and
costs. Important decisions on what is, and what is not,
nationally available on the NHS have added to this
debate. For example, it was ruled that interferon beta
should not be prescribed to alleviate the suffering of
multiple sclerosis. The decision was made on the
basis that the long-term clinical benefits were out-
weighed by a high cost w23x. However, opponents to
the decision argued that interferon beta was the only
available drug to delay the progression of the disease
w23x and that the ruling had been based on its effect-
iveness in treating secondary progressive multiple
sclerosis that had already been proven to have
modest clinical benefit w24x. The case is particularly
important since the National Institute for Clinical
Effectiveness was effectively able to defeat a high
court ruling from 1997 in which a health authority was
found to have ‘acted unlawfully’ in denying interferon
beta to a patient with multiple sclerosis w25x.
If the National Institute for Clinical Effectiveness has
provided the political backing for drug rationing across
the National Health Service, there is no doubt that its
work is based on well-researched and considered
investigations of the cost and clinical effectiveness
implications of each drug. Indeed, on balance, its
impact has been to raise the overall drug cost burden
to the NHS rather than reduce it.
The Commission for Health
Improvement
A further tool for ensuring quality standards in the
National Health Service has come in the form of the
Commission for Health Improvement, an independent
inspectorate set up to improve the quality of patient
care. The Commission was set the task of assessing
every NHS organisation, investigating service failures,
monitoring whether national guidelines were being
fulfilled, and advising the NHS on good practice w14x.
The Commission has proved itself robust in its criti-
cisms of poor service. For example, when asked to
investigate a hospital that had higher than average
death rates following heart and lung transplants, the
Commission concluded that many patients had died
who may not have done if treated in another transplant
unit elsewhere in the country w26x. The work of the
Commission is related to that of another new body,
the Modernisation Agency, which was set up to pro-
mote best practice w9x. This agency has been instru-
mental in identifying ‘beacons’ of good practice from
whom others can learn and its role is to help distribute
those lessons to the rest of the NHS.
‘Earned’ autonomy
In contrast to these imposed measures of quality
assurance, the NHS Plan supports the idea of allowing
greater freedom from the centre for local innovation
and self-determination. The Plan talks specifically
about creating a ‘new system of earned autonomy’ in
which the Government devolves power ‘as moderni-
sation takes hold’. In reality, earning this autonomy is
linked directly to achieving Government-led quality and
access targets w27x.
To ascertain the performance of hospitals, the Gov-
ernment has instituted a star rating system based on
a number of key components (see Box 3). Those with
three stars, the best rating, will be allowed ‘earned
autonomy’ manifest, amongst other freedoms, in less
frequent monitoring from the centre, the ability to
innovate new services without receiving prior approval,
and the opportunity to access additional resources
without having to go through a bidding process.
Indeed, the Government has established a ‘perform-
ance fund’, which will rise to £500 m by 2003y4, for
use by good performers. Those with zero stars, the
worst rating, will be subject to external intervention to
improve performance.International Journal of Integrated Care – Vol. 2, 1 March 2002 – ISSN 1568-4156 – http://www.ijic.org/
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Box 4. Key access goals for the NHS w20x
Targets: – Maximum wait for outpatient appointments to fall to three months
and for inpatient treatment to fall to six months by 2005
– Two-thirds of all outpatient appointments and inpatient elective
admissions to be pre-booked by 2003y4 aiming for 100% by 2005
– Guaranteed access to a primary care professional within 24 hours
and to a primary care doctor within 48 hours by 2004
Mechanisms: – NHS Direct – telephone and internet health care advice
– Booked admissions for elective care
– Walk-in centres and one-stop health care clinics
– New primary health care ‘teams’
– Personal Medical Services
Discussion
At the heart of the Labour Government’s centralist
approach to quality assurance and performance mon-
itoring is concern over extreme variability in standards
of care across the NHS. However, the determination
of Government to deliver the ‘modernisation agenda’
in such a centrally determined way has imposed much
stress, uncertainty and morale difficulties amongst
staff. Moreover, the approach could be considered to
be over-prescriptive in terms of binding clinical deci-
sion-making to ensure homogeneity of care. In this
sense, a centralist and prescriptive approach allows
less room for service innovation and appropriate local
variances in care provided to certain groups.
The centrally-driven approach to quality assurance
also impinges on long-held and jealously guarded
professional freedoms. As a result, the medical pro-
fession has given a lukewarm reception to the impo-
sition of national standards of care believing them to
be as much a ‘straightjacket’ to the delivery of care
as an attempt to design and deliver more effective
health services w28x. Others have described national
standards as a ‘noose’ around the head of the NHS
since they promise a level of care to the public that
they may not be able to provide. As a result, some
have predicted a rise in litigation as a cash-strapped
NHS fails to provide the standard of service prescribed
centrally w29x.
The negative response to top-down quality control in
the NHS was perhaps to be expected given evidence
from Health Maintenance Organisations in the USA.
Health Maintenance Organisations have imposed on
physicians the need to co-operate with utilisation man-
agement, cost containment measures and quality
assurance activities. However, as a consequence of
this control, a managed care backlash within Health
Maintenance Organisations has developed as physi-
cians have been angered over their loss of authority,
autonomy and income w30x.
There is a strong perception within the Service that
its ability to deliver centrally led quality standards will
remain impossible until sufficient injections of funding
work their way through to develop the necessary
capacity to tackle change effectively. In the absence
of immediate additional resources, achieving goals
such as those imposed by National Service Frame-
works have been regarded as unrealistic w31x. There
is no doubt that a quality-driven NHS is seen as
laudable, but the method of implementation has as
yet not provided the conditions or the incentives for
the deliverers of care to reach these aims in a sensible
timeframe.
Improving access to care services
Improving access to care services is an important
theme in the NHS Plan that appears to reflect growing
impatience from the public to a system that has
increasingly forced patients to long waits for aspects
of care provision. To address this, the NHS Plan
pledged to significantly reduce waiting times for out-
patient appointments, eradicate long waiting lists in
accident and emergency wards, and enable patients
to see a primary care provider within 48 hours (see
Box 4) w9x.
Whilst NHS hospitals have been performance man-
aged on their ability to contain costs and reduce
waiting lists and times for several years, the NHS Plan
introduced a range of new mechanisms to attain
access goals. These mechanisms have been radical
and include the redistribution of primary care profes-
sionals through new local contracts, investment and
modernisation of primary care in needy areas, walk-in
centres, and NHS Direct. All of these approaches
suggest the willingness and potential to promote
access to care for those population groups poorly
served by the current system (such as the poor and
homeless) w32x.International Journal of Integrated Care – Vol. 2, 1 March 2002 – ISSN 1568-4156 – http://www.ijic.org/
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NHS Direct
NHS Direct, which is a telephone or Internet help line
for health care advice, was established as way of
managing demand for emergency care. In the view of
its proponents, NHS Direct has the potential to act as
the new ‘gatekeeper’ to NHS and other care services
by, for example, integrating social services and pri-
mary care teams for out of hours care; enabling the
process of booking appointments with general practi-
tioners; and out-calling to at risk patients w32x.
The evidence on the use of NHS Direct to date
suggests that it has been used primarily for ‘social’
reasons. In particular, research has shown that many
users wanted to gain access to primary medical advice
out of hours of general practice surgery times, partic-
ularly women with young children w33x. Moreover, a
high area of unmet need has been observed for advice
on mental health problems and sexual health issues
w33x. Currently, there appears to be no data on
whether NHS Direct has had any significant impact
on reducing emergency admissions w34x. There has
also been concern that the system has yet to be linked
to formal booking or referral mechanisms. Moreover,
the system has not been used by poorer members of
society, due to technology and telephone costs, and
has also been under-used by the elderly who appear
to prefer the continuity of face-to-face contact with a
known primary care physician w34x.
Walk-in centres
Walk in centres, consisting of nurse consultation,
diagnosis, triage, and minor treatment, were envis-
aged as a way to improve convenience of access to
areas under-served by existing primary care services.
They were also thought to have merit as a safety net
for the disadvantaged and unregistered w32x. Such
centres also have the potential to expand beyond their
medical function to be community health centres pro-
viding welfare advice, information, and screening –
therefore delivering a social requirement as well as to
reduce inequities in access to health care services
w32x.
Walk-in-centres have been unpopular amongst pri-
mary care doctors in England who argue that they
inflate demand, reduce continuity of care and compro-
mise their traditional gate keeping role. Comparative
evidence suggests that such fears could be well
founded. The development of walk-in-centres in Can-
ada, for example, led to more fragmented care, differ-
ential treatments, and inadequate follow-up of chronic
conditions w32x. Indeed, access to walk-in-centres in
Canada was mainly promoted to the convenience of
existing users with minor problems via longer opening
hours rather than promoting access to disadvantaged
groups. In England, early indications suggest that
walk-in-centres are similarly and predominantly acces-
sed by higher social classes though also providing an
unmet need for information and advice, particularly in
the areas of contraception, sexual health, and drug
misuse w35x.
The key problem behind the walk-in-centre approach
is the potential reduction in the threshold of care that
may increase demand uncontrollably, particularly if it
fuels demand for the more ‘social’ elements of health
care. The integration of walk-in-centres and NHS
Direct with the role of general practitioners and ‘tradi-
tional’ primary care will be a key to overcoming such
problems. However, such integration is also likely to
be the biggest obstacle since it requires significant
co-ordination, collaboration and networking between
professionals and providers that have traditionally
worked as autonomous and separate parts of the
system. A requirement of the Government’s access
agenda, therefore, is the need to instil flexibility and
integration as a core component to each health pro-
fessionals agenda such that, for example, the use of
shared protocols and regular exchange of information
becomes a characteristic of the system.
Primary health care teams
The access agenda also suggests a move away from
the traditional general practitioner-centred gate-
keeping role. A key Government priority has been to
develop new roles for primary care professionals and
encourage partnership between doctors, nurses and
social workers. Indeed, the current renegotiation of
the national GP contract may specify, or encourage
through financial incentives, working in partnership
with other primary care professionals w36x. Indeed,
such arrangements have already been encouraged
through the development of Personal Medical Services
pilots in which general practitioners provide an agreed
set of services under a salaried arrangement with
local health authorities w37x.
Discussion
Access to care will remain a key theme in Labour’s
modernisation agenda. The strategy has encouraged
the development of multiple entry points into primary
care. If the approach is to succeed, the importance of
co-ordination and integration for effective assessment
and triage must not be underestimated w38x. This isInternational Journal of Integrated Care – Vol. 2, 1 March 2002 – ISSN 1568-4156 – http://www.ijic.org/
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important since the promotion of multiple access
points runs the risk of reducing the continuity of NHS
service provision to patients and providing services on
demand rather than according to need. Whilst one
might argue that such a system would meet the unmet
need of social users and those wanting to receive
welfare advice, the cost is likely to be prohibitive.
Moreover, the measures proposed may not necessar-
ily provide better access to NHS services for disad-
vantaged groups nor necessarily reduce demand on
other parts of the system. Furthermore, a system
based purely on promoting access to care can cause
perverse incentives for providers in justifying perform-
ance since the system would be based on levels of
numbers seen rather than on treatment according to
need. The information technology and wider co-
ordination implications for the service is also likely to
inflate costs to the system.
Promoting inter-professional
working and integrating service
provision
Related to the Government’s intention of promoting
better quality and access to care is the NHS Plan’s
intention to bring about the redefinition of the roles of
health and social care professionals w9x. Much of the
emphasis is placed on primary care services, partic-
ularly general practitioners, where it is suggested that
new modern contracts will be created that are quality-
based. This implies far greater clinical accountability
and justification within a profession and a Service that
has traditionally been based on local clinical
autonomy.
New primary care organisations
The role of new local contracts to employ primary care
professionals on a salaried basis is being encouraged.
Indeed, the emphasis appears to be based on the
creation of US-style managed care organisations in
the guise of Primary Care Trusts w39x. These organi-
sations, at least in theory, should enable the better
integration of general practitioner, community, spe-
cialist and local authority services w38x. Moreover,
these organisations have the power to question tradi-
tional professional and organisational boundaries
often seen as a key barrier to effective integration
w40x.
Many general practitioners and hospital consultants
are unhappy about the Government’s modernisation
proposals because they undermine their status and
professional autonomy. Successive Governments
have been attempting to bring general practitioners
under the aegis of mainstream NHS management, a
move that hits at the very heart of their small business
ethic. It is reported that general practitioners feel
increasingly victimised by proposals to shift the fund-
ing of single-handed practices under new local con-
tractual plans w41x. Indeed, so unhappy have general
practitioners been with their relationship to the NHS
that many are looking to resign as they struggle to
cope with what they perceive as unrealistic and
unmanageable demands. A 2001 survey reported that
two-thirds of family doctors had lower morale than five
years previously whilst 90 per cent believed that NHS
Plan targets were not achievable without proper fund-
ing and increased remuneration to general practice
w42x.
In an attempt to improve capacity within the NHS the
Government has also been examining various options
of professional coercion. For example, the NHS Plan
suggests that newly qualified hospital consultants
should be forced to do solely NHS work for seven
years after graduation. This idea in the Plan was
clearly aimed at retaining consultant numbers within
the NHS. However, consultants have responded to
the idea that they must ‘repay the State’ by holding
an exclusive contract with the NHS as ‘insulting and
contemptible’. Many trainee consultants, for example,
have threatened to move abroad or set up consor-
tiums outside of the NHS should such a system be
imposed w43x.
As well as promoting capacity within the Service, the
NHS Plan described the need to reduce professional
demarcations between staff. The idea is to develop
new skill mixes amongst health care teams such that
nurses and social care staff work together in teams
with medical professionals within the same organisa-
tion. This would have the potential advantage of
allowing nurses, for example, to attend to the minor
and non-medical users of the system and help free
up time for medical professionals to treat the more
urgent cases and to explore careers in more specialist
medical areas. It is suggested in the NHS Plan that
nurses, in particular, will be provided with greater
opportunities to extend their roles (for example, to
prescribe medicines) w9x. The Government has set
aside £280 m over three years to skill-up such staff
and begin to establish a new generation of managerial
and clinical leaders.
The development of new primary care organisations
in England in the form of Primary Care Groups,
Primary Care Trusts and Personal Medical Services
pilots has helped to co-ordinate the roles of health
and social care professionals w37,44x. However, a key
frailty in the system has been exposed during thisInternational Journal of Integrated Care – Vol. 2, 1 March 2002 – ISSN 1568-4156 – http://www.ijic.org/
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process. That frailty comes from the differing training
and cultures of family doctors, nurses, community
staff, hospital clinicians and social care staff that mean
each considers themselves as a collection of individ-
uals rather than as a team w45x. Moreover, the devel-
opment of collective or corporate ownership of
problems within new primary care organisations has
required a significant widening of their terms of refer-
ence outside their traditional professional boundaries.
Evidence suggests that this process is possible, but
requires considerable time to nurture new relation-
ships through inclusive and local negotiation w35x.
Without such space and time, primary care organisa-
tions are unlikely to develop the unity of purpose
across the professions that the Government wishes to
see happen.
New health and social care partnerships
The development of new primary care organisations
is but one component part of the Government’s strat-
egy to promote professional and service integration in
the NHS. This theme within the NHS Plan is taken
further forward through the vision that health and
social care organisations should become formally inte-
grated. This would mean, for example, social services
and the NHS coming together with new agreements
to pool resources to commission and provide health
and social care as a single organisation w9x. The idea
behind this is that integration would prevent patients,
particularly older people, from ‘falling in the cracks’
between the two services or being left in hospital
when they could be safely in their own home.
The introduction of the Health Act 1999 provided
health and social care organisations in England with
new opportunities to integrate public services w46x.
The Act removed the legal obstacle to pooling health
and social care budgets and promoted the notion of
joint commissioning and integrated health and social
care provision. The NHS Plan went further by detailing
a vision of Care Trusts, or new multi-purpose legal
bodies to commission and be responsible for all local
health and social care.
The use of flexibilities within the Health Act 1999 to
develop new joint services, and the development of
Care Trusts, has not proven popular w47x. For exam-
ple, there were only thirty cases of the use of health
act flexibilities following the ‘launch’ in November
2000. Of these, most were used to co-ordinate existing
services better (for example, by integrating community
health and social service teams or developing joint
health and social care beds). The emphasis has also
been on the process of organisational integration
rather than achieving better service delivery. Success
amongst the first cohort was expressed in terms of
developing good relations between partners and
resolving staff issues as opposed to achieving better
userycarer services. Indeed, new partnerships had yet
to overcome demarcations between existing profes-
sional groups. Less than 20 per cent of cases reported
any staff relocation (for example, from secondary to
primary care) or the development of new integrated
teams that might reduce fragmentation of delivery and
improve continuity of care delivery to users w47x.
In March 2001, the Department of Health detailed its
emerging framework for Care Trusts w48x. The docu-
ment reneged on the original and radical proposal in
the NHS Plan that Care Trusts should be a completely
new statutory organisation to be responsible for all
health and social care. Instead, existing statutory
agencies would remain sacrosanct whilst the notion
of a Care Trust became not much more than a
symbolic name for a ‘virtual’ partnership. Once it was
learned that the Department of Health had scaled
back on its original proposals, the number of organi-
sations interested in becoming ‘demonstrator’ Care
Trusts in 2002 reduced dramatically w49x. Many Pri-
mary Care Trusts at the forefront of change reported
that ‘no genuine benefits’ were to be had from Care
Trust status following the backtracking in its scope
w50x.
Discussion
A number of key issues emerge from the methods
employed to promote service integration. One is the
apparent dominance within new partnerships of health
professionals and the medical model of care and the
marginilisation of social services and other profession-
al groups w47x. The integration agenda appears dom-
inated by the NHS leading to distrust and defensive
behaviours from potential partners, especially local
authorities. Another issue is related to the observation
that the geographical boundaries of new health and
social care partnerships appear often to be different
to existing organisational boundaries of primary care
groups or trusts and of local authorities w47x. Such
geographical and administrative discontinuities are
surprisingly commonplace and, ironically, have the
potential to create the same kinds of barriers to cross-
agency working that the agenda they are following
seeks to avoid. This is the ‘disintegrated integration
syndrome’ and can be destructive if not contained
w40x.International Journal of Integrated Care – Vol. 2, 1 March 2002 – ISSN 1568-4156 – http://www.ijic.org/
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Providing a more public health or
‘whole-systems’ approach
A final key element of the NHS Plan is to develop a
care service that is aimed at improving health in its
broadest sense. As the NHS Plan concedes, ‘good
health depends upon social, environmental and eco-
nomic factors such as deprivation, housing, education
and nutrition’ w9x. As well as this understanding on the
need for a more public health approach to care, there
is an associated commitment to reducing health in-
equalities. The NHS Plan envisages the creation of a
task force on inequalities and integrated public health
groups across the NHS and local government. Such
sentiments are reaffirmations of the need for NHS
services to not work in isolation.
Since the production of Saving Lives: Our Healthier
Nation w51x, a range of initiatives to promote health in
the NHS have been advanced. These include Sure
Start, an initiative targeted to support the development
of young children in deprived communities, and other
policies that have promoted reductions in smoking,
better diet and nutrition, and to tackle drugs and
alcohol misuse.
The need for organisational and service integration is
inherent in the Government’s agenda on promoting
health and reducing health inequalities. However, the
reform process appears to have focused overmuch
on structural change in organisations. Such changes,
it has been argued, target the delivery of care rather
than the root causes of ill health w52x. Indeed, at a
national level, strategies that directly link attaining
health improvement to economic regeneration or edu-
cation have yet to develop.
At a more local level, public services in England have
embraced many strategies to integrate services for
specific local issues yet, as a whole, these strategies
remain poorly co-ordinated. For example, whilst Pri-
mary Care Trusts are required to develop Health
Improvement Programmes that provide the basis for
prioritising services needed by their population, local
authorities in the same localities work to a separate
set of priorities based on Community Plans w53x.
Moreover, the priorities identified by Primary Care
Trusts through Health Improvement Programmes are
rarely, if ever, linked to the distribution of resources
since these are determined through other mecha-
nisms. Hence, priorities for health improvement are
not always reflected in investment.
Whilst most localities in England have developed a
range of partnerships between health and social care,
these are often poorly co-ordinated. For example, in
Newcastle-under-Lyme, a locality in Staffordshire with
an urban and rural mix, a dizzying array of locality
partnerships developed in the 1990s. These partner-
ships included schemes for urban regeneration, the
redevelopment of coalfields, a health action zone, and
partnership to tackle crime and disorder, the creation
of a ‘healthy living centre’, and Sure Start amongst at
least 20 others. As a result, silos upon silos have
been created that has led to the development of new
organisational bureaucracies w54x. In other words, the
eagerness of different partners to tackle certain issues
has led to a ‘compartmentalisation’ of approaches.
This process is common across England in which
layers upon layers of partnership innovations are
being created that, ironically, have the potential to
create the same kinds of barriers to ‘whole system’
integration that many were designed to overcome.
This is yet another example of the ‘disintegrated
integration syndrome’ that is so endemic in the English
public sector.
A recent Government examination of partnership
working between health and social care concluded
that there are ‘profound systematic and structural
problems which relate to the lack of co-ordination
between different government departments, statutory
agencies, elected authorities and the voluntary sector’
w55x. It recommended that Health Improvement Pro-
grammes and Community Plans should be integrated
as a matter of urgency. Moreover, better policy co-
ordination at local level has been proposed through
the development of Local Strategic Partnerships
w56,57x. The purpose of these is to provide a vehicle
for the rationalisation of multiple local plans and part-
nerships into a single co-ordinated initiative. However,
in the NHS Plan, the original idea for Local Strategic
Partnerships as the key to integrating planning pro-
cesses was rejected. The NHS Plan regards their
development as simply an umbrella for linking health
education and other causes of social exclusion w53x.
Implementing the NHS Plan –
barriers from further
organisational restructuring
The NHS Plan is broadly supported across the NHS.
Indeed, some observers have suggested that the Plan
is ‘as good as it gets’ since it sets out enduring
principles on which change should be based and
promises a significant injection of money sustained
over five years w10,58x.
From the discussion of the various aspects of the Plan
given above, it would appear that the nature and
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on two key factors. First, appropriate resources are
required to create capacity within the NHS to enable
new functions to develop. There was a fear expressed
by many that the Government was looking for results
without first investing in people to enable this to
happen. For example, there have been real concerns
about the lack of management capacity and resources
in Primary Care Trusts and their ability to cope with
taking forward greater commissioning responsibilities
w45x. Second, the promotion of access and service
integration requires the development of significant
co-ordination, collaboration and networking between
agencies and individuals. This is particularly important
for health and social care professionals within the
system since their historically separate professions
mean that a significant period of change management
is required to allow new roles and partnerships to
evolve.
However, the ability of the Service to deliver the NHS
Plan has come under increasing stress following the
Department of Health’s July 2001 publication Shifting
the Balance of Power in the NHS: securing delivery
w59x. The document was meant to be the frame-
work through which the goals of the NHS Plan could
be delivered. However, the document set out radical
proposals for further organisational restructuring
including:
● The replacement of the current 95 health authori-
ties with 28 larger ‘strategic’ health authorities; and
● The transfer to Primary Care Trusts of most health
authority responsibilities.
The outcome from this structural reorganisation is
likely to be a system in which care will be commis-
sioned by Primary Care Trusts holding a budget for
populations of about 250,000 people. The commis-
sioning approach of Primary Care Trusts will be influ-
enced heavily by strategic guidance from national
government guidelines and strategies developed by
their host Strategic Health Authorities. Acute hospitals
will remain independently ‘governed’, whilst commu-
nity and primary care services will be integrated and
more directly managed through a system of local
contracts.
The assumption that is implicit is that such structural
change will help improve the performance of the NHS
in delivering the NHS Plan. However, the scale and
pace of the new structural changes (meant to be
completed by April 2002) seem at odds with the need
to deliver demanding NHS Plan targets. Indeed, a
recent survey of 304 chief executives found that three-
quarters felt the Shifting the Balance reorganisation
would severely delay the delivery of the NHS Plan
and create a major disincentive for organisations and
individuals who would now focus on survival rather
than on delivering the future w60x. Others have shown
how gains in ownership and involvement that resulted
from the creation of new primary care organisations
have lost momentum. In this sense, the Government’s
rhetoric of empowerment and devolution has been
tempered by an approach that has centrally deter-
mined their size, shape and function w44x.
Through its emphasis on structural reorganisation the
Government may have missed the key challenges
faced in delivering its NHS Plan. As this article has
shown, the need to address cultural and behavioural
change is probably far more important and appropriate
than an approach that just rearranges structural fur-
niture. A less directive set of implementation plans
were required that performance managed the Service
on results rather than on process. The lack of space
and time to build on and encourage delivery and
partnership has led to increasing disengagement from
general practitioners and hospital clinicians who feel
pressured, overworked and undervalued. Moreover,
managers within the system find their jobs increasingly
at risk if targets are not met. Such a scenario paints
an increasingly unhealthy picture of those within the
Service struggling to cope with excessive levels of
top-down Government initiatives.
Conclusion – towards an
integrated public sector?
A number of conflicting messages appear to emerge
from Labour’s modernisation agenda in relation to the
better integration of public services in England. On
the one hand, the tone of the ‘modernisation agenda’
suggests that professional, organisational and service
integration are key tasks. For example, the Labour
Government can be credited with the creation of
mechanisms that removed legal obstacles to such
joint working w40,47x. This has allowed health and
social care agencies the potential to pool budgets and
integrate service provision. Furthermore, the devel-
opment of new local contracts and organisations for
the delivery of primary care, such as Personal Medical
Services pilots, gives rise to a vision of a ‘managed’
service that integrates the accountability and perform-
ance management of professionals and the delivery
of services they provide. The NHS Plan envisages the
creation of a ‘single care network’ in which family
doctors, other primary care and social care staffInternational Journal of Integrated Care – Vol. 2, 1 March 2002 – ISSN 1568-4156 – http://www.ijic.org/
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work in teams providing a range of care services for
patients. The National Service Frameworks also
promote the need for integration. For example, the
National Service Framework for older people encour-
ages the development of intermediate care services
at the interface between hospital inpatient care and
nursing home or care at home services w19x.
However, other policies suggest that the integration of
public services may be somewhat limited. For exam-
ple, the NHS Plan’s emphasis on promoting access
to care is suggestive that care delivery is more impor-
tant than tackling poverty and the causes of ill health
at source. Moreover, recent structural reorganisation
has not overcome the different alignments of geo-
graphical boundaries and constituencies that inhibit
the ability of health and social care agencies to
integrate. Evidence suggests that Primary Care Trusts
have not been organised to promote geographical
alignment with local authorities (except in London),
but have instead been based on creating associations
with, as far as possible, like-minded health profession-
als w47x. This process reveals a disturbing lack of
policy direction to aid organisational integration as well
as the lack of weight given by health professionals to
the integrated care agenda.
Perhaps the key failure of the Labour Government’s
modernisation agenda to date is its predisposition to
curing Service ills through structural change when
much of the available evidence suggests that the key
and persisting barrier to service integration is the
values and cultures held by professionals w1,40,
45,47x.
Emerging lessons from the development of Personal
Medical Service pilots in England suggest that service
integration and professional team working has, as yet,
failed to materialise despite the incentives for team
working under new local contracts w61x. Such findings
suggest that if the Government really wants to move
towards a more integrated public sector then the focus
needs to shift to a process of cultural and behavioural
change amongst health and social care professionals.
Deeming the solution to be structural is likely to be
doomed to failure. Whilst structural solutions might
remove organisational barriers to help parties engage,
they do not address the fact that professionals with
fundamentally different attitudes to service delivery
are unlikely to use them.
Lessons for other countries
The English experience of ‘modernisation’ has a num-
ber of implications for other countries. In particular,
the motivation for further reform of the English health
care system was the inability of its ‘internal market’ to
provide effective, comprehensive, and accessible care
services. Given that the Governments of many other
countries have similarly had to intervene due to the
failure of ‘managed competition’ in their health care
systems w7x, developing countries such as those in
Eastern Europe or Latin America currently seeking
market solutions to the provision of public health care
should be aware that the approach is likely to pro-
mote inequity whilst not necessarily promoting cost-
efficiency.
Another key lesson surrounds the ability of Govern-
ments to gain the allegiance of health care profession-
als to work in a collective manner. In most countries,
except through heavily socially engineered systems
such as Cuba, authorities or central insurance
organisations are administrative rather than manage-
rial since their decision-making power over profession-
als remains very limited. Despite the rhetoric of
devolving power to frontline professionals, the impo-
sition of a range of national frameworks, clinical gov-
ernance arrangements, and quality-based local
contracts in England appear to be shifting the balance
in favour of the manager and making the health care
professional far more accountable. The approach
appears similar to those quality assurance mecha-
nisms employed by US Health Maintenance Organi-
sations. In both cases health care professionals have
baulked at the level of managerial control.
A final important observation of the English experience
is that professional and managerial allegiance to exist-
ing health and social care institutions remains a sig-
nificant and enduring barrier to integration. One might
suggest, therefore, that to develop integrated care
systems better one should move away from institu-
tionally based care that fragments service delivery.
Indeed, the English Department of Health has recog-
nised the need to develop ‘networks’ of care, already
developing for cancer care w62x, basing its ideas on
innovations from countries such as Australia and Scot-
land where clinical networks have developed amongst
providers of care that are unconstrained by existing
professional and organisational boundaries w63x.
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